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Abstract
The IEEE 802.11 protocol is a popular standard for
wireless local area networks. Its medium access control
layer (MAC) is a carrier sense multiple access with col-
lision avoidance (CSMA/CA) design and includes an ex-
ponential backoff mechanism that makes it a possible tar-
get for probabilistic model checking. In this work, we iden-
tify ways to increase the scope of application of probabilis-
tic model checking to the 802.11 MAC. Current techniques
do not scale to networks of even moderate size. To work
around this problem, we identify properties of the protocol
that can be used to simplify the models and make verifi-
cation feasible. Using these observations, we directly op-
timize the probabilistic timed automata models while pre-
serving probabilistic reachability measures. We substanti-
ate our claims of significant reduction by our results from
using the probabilistic model checker PRISM.
1. Introduction
The IEEE 802.11 protocol [9] is a popular standard for
wireless networks. Its medium access control layer (MAC)
is a carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) design and includes an exponential backoff
mechanism that makes it an ideal target for probabilistic
model checking. This protocol has been modeled using a
range of techniques such as finite state machines [20] and
probabilistic timed automata [15].
The 802.11 protocol suffers from a potential livelock
problem, demonstrated formally in [20], which is mitigated
only by the presence of a finite retry limit for each data
packet. The livelock arises because it is possible, although
improbable, for two stations to behave symmetrically and
continuously collide until they drop their respective pack-
ets on exceeding the retry limit. In such a scenario, it is use-
ful to bound the probability of such pathologically symmet-
ric behavior. This motivates the application of probabilistic
model checking to the problem of computing probabilities
of desired and undesired behavior in the protocol. Two pri-
mary properties of interest are: the probability of the num-
ber of retries reaching a certain count and the probability of
meeting a soft deadline.
A recent solution to the problem of obtaining these prob-
abilities has been proposed in [15]. It models a limited (but
critical) aspect of the protocol using Probabilistic Timed
Automata (PTA) [14] and exploits available tools, namely,
the Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker (PRISM) [13, 2]
for computing the probability values and the real time
model checker Uppaal [18] as a proof assistant. Results on
the probability of the backoff counter on a station reaching a
particular value and the probability of a packet being trans-
mitted within a certain deadline are presented. This work,
however, suffers from scalability problems. The model as-
sumes only two stations (sender destination pairs). When
we extended the models to 3 stations (and 3 correspond-
ing destinations), which is a practical sized network topol-
ogy, we found it computationally infeasible to model check
properties of interest. These problems are compounded by
an inaccurate assumption that the packet length can vary on
every retransmission.
The aim of this work is twofold. First, we present a more
accurate and scalable model for the protocol. Second, we
set up a logical framework to exploit protocol specific re-
dundancies. Under this framework, we perform a number of
provably correct optimizations that reduce the generalized
multi station model. The optimizations involve abstracting
away the deterministic waits, and considering only a sub-
set of the allowed packet sizes that nevertheless captures all
the relevant behavior. In addition, we duplicate the model
reduction technique of [15] for the multi station problem.
Our reduced models are immediately verifiable in
PRISM and require no further tools. However, the op-
tion of using tools like RAPTURE [6] on the reduced
PTA models remains. Our results show a reduction
in state space over the existing solution for two sta-
tions. We are also able to successfully model check a
topology of three station that was infeasible with the cur-
rent models.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We begin
with the modeling formalism used in this paper. We present
the scalable models for the multi station 802.11 problem
and discuss the behavior of the protocol. Next, we present
a notion of equivalence in probabilistic systems that ab-
stracts away deterministic deterministic paths in the sys-
tem but preserves probabilistic reachability. We give suf-
ficient requirements for equivalence both at the level of
untimed probabilistic systems and probabilistic timed au-
tomata. Based on this framework, we present our set of re-
ductions to the generalized model for the multi station prob-
lem. We also show that we can verify soft deadlines inspite
of these optimizations. We conclude with results that detail
state space reduction as well as case studies for a three sta-
tion topology.
2. Modeling formalism for the 802.11 proto-
col
In order to efficiently model and verify the 802.11 pro-
tocol, we need a modeling formalism that can represent
the protocol at sufficient depth and, at the same time, must
be amenable to transformations for more efficient verifica-
tion. We have been guided by the existing work in [15] in
our choice of Probabilistic Timed Automata to model the
802.11 protocol.
We introduce Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) [14],
Probabilistic Systems (PS) [15, 19] and fully probabilistic
systems (FPS). All these have been surveyed in [12] with
special reference to their relationship in the context of prob-
abilistic model checking.
Let χ be a set of non-negative real valued variables called
clocks. Call Z the set of zones over χ, which is the set
of all possible atomic constraints of the form x ∼ c and
(x − y) ∼ c and their closure under conjunction. Here
x, y ∈ χ, ∼ ∈ {<,≤, >,≥} and c ∈ N, where N is the
set of natural numbers. A clock valuation v is the assign-
ment of values in R≥0(where R≥0 is the set of non-negative
reals) to all clocks in χ. The concept of a clock valuation v
satisfying a zone Y , indicated as v ⊳ Y , is naturally derived
by assigning values to each clock in the zone and check-
ing whether all constraints are satisfied.
Definition 1 A probabilistic timed automaton is a tuple
(L, l, χ,Σ, I, P ) where L is a finite set of states, l is the ini-
tial state, χ is the set of clocks and Σ is a finite set of labels
used to label transitions. The function I is a map I : L→ Z
called the invariant condition. The probabilistic edge rela-
tion P is defined as P ⊆ L×Z×Σ×Dist(2χ×L), where
Dist(2χ×L) is the set of all probability distributions, each
elementary outcome of which corresponds to resetting some
clocks to zero and moving to a state in L. We call a distin-
guished (not necessarily non-null) subset Σu of the set of
events as urgent events.
A critical feature of PTAs that makes them powerful
modeling tools is that each transition presents probabilis-
tic choice in the PTA while different outgoing probabilistic
transitions from a state present non-deterministic choice in
the PTA. Hence, a PTA can model non-determinism, which
is inherent in the composition of asynchronous parallel sys-
tems.
Composition of PTAs is a cross product of states with
the condition that the composed PTAs must synchronize on
shared actions. For a detailed description see [15].
A feature of PTAs that is useful for higher-level mod-
eling is urgent channels. Urgent channels are a special set
of edge labels (symbols) on which a PTA must synchronize
whenever possible.
Definition 2 A probabilistic system (PS), is a tuple
(S, s,Σ, Steps) where S is a finite set of states, s is the
start state, Σ is a finite set of labels and Steps is a func-
tion Steps : S → 2Σ×Dist(S) where Dist(S) is the set of
all distributions over S.
This is the same as the simple probabilistic automaton of
[19].
Definition 3 Given a PTA T = (L, l, χ,Σ, I, P ),
the semantics of T is the Probabilistic System
[[T ]]= (S, s,Act , Steps), with the following defini-
tions:
S ⊆ L × R
|χ|
≥0 is the set of states with the restric-
tions (s, v) ∈ S iff (s ∈ L and v ⊳ I(l)) and s = (l, 0).
Act = R≥0 ∪Σ. This reflects either actions correspond-
ing to time steps (R≥0) or actions from the PTA (Σ).
Steps is the least set of probabilistic transitions contain-
ing, for each (l, v) ∈ S, a set of action distribution pairs
(σ, µ) where σ ∈ Σ and µ is a probability distribution over
S. Steps for a state s = (l, v) is defined as follows.
I. for each t ∈ R≥0 (t, µ) ∈ Steps(s) iff
1. µ(l, v + t) = 1 and v + t′ ⊳ I(l) for all 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t.
2. For every probabilistic edge of the form (l, g, σ,−) ∈
P , if v+ t′ ⊳g for any 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t, then σ is non-urgent.
II. for each (l, g, σ, p) ∈ P , let (σ, µ) ∈ Steps(s) iff v ⊳
g and for each (l′, v′) ∈ S: µ(l′, v′) = ΣX⊆χ&v′=v[X:=0]
p(X, l′), the sum being over all clock resets that result in
the valuation v′.
A critical result [17], analogous to the region construction
result for timed automata, states that it is sufficient to as-
sume only integer increments when all zones are closed
(there are no strict inequalities). Hence, the definition given
above is modified to S ⊆ L × N|χ| and Act = N ∪ Σ. Un-
der integer semantics, the size of the state space is propor-
tional to the largest constant used. For the rest of this paper,
we will assume integer semantics.
Note that, in the presence of non-determinism, the prob-
ability measure of a path in a PS is undefined. Hence, define
an adversary or scheduler that resolves non-determinism as
follows:
Definition 4 An adversary of the Probabilistic System P =
(S, s,Act , Steps) is a function f : S → ∪s∈SSteps(s)
where f(s) ∈ Steps(s).
We only consider simple adversaries that do not change
their decision about an outgoing distribution every time a
state is revisited, their sufficiency has been shown in [5].
A simple adversary induces a Fully Probabilistic System
(FPS) as defined below.
Definition 5 A simple adversary A of a Probabilistic Sys-
tem P = (S, s,Act , Steps) induces a Fully Probabilis-
tic System (FPS) or Discrete Time Markov Chain PA =
(S, s, P ). Here, P (s) = A(s), the unique outgoing proba-
bility distribution for each s ∈ S, where we drop the edge
label on the transition.
Thus, given a PS M and a set of “target states” F , con-
sider an adversary A and the corresponding FPS MA. A
probability space (ProbA) may be defined on MA via
a cylinder construction [11]. A path ω in MA is sim-
ply a (possibly infinite) sequence of states ss1s2... such
that there is a transition of non-zero probability between
any two consecutive states in the path. For model check-
ing, we are interested in
ProbReachA(F )
def
= ProbA{ω ∈ PathA∞ | ∃i ∈
N where ω(i) ∈ F}. F is the desired set of target states,
ω(i) is the ith state in the path ω and PathA∞ represents
all infinite paths in MA. Define MaxProbReachM (F ) and
MinProbReachM (F ) as the supremum and infimum re-
spectively of {ProbReachA(F )} where the quantification
is over all adversaries.
3. Logic Formulas Under Consideration
Properties of interest at the PTA level are specified us-
ing Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic (PCTL) formu-
las [7]. We limit ourselves to restricted syntax (but non
trivial) PCTL formulas, expressible as P∼λ{♦p}, where
∼∈ {<,>,≤,≥} and λ is the constant probability bound
that is being model checked for. These PCTL formulas
translate directly into a probabilistic reachability problem
on the semantic Probabilistic System corresponding to the
PTA. The reason for this restriction is that, in the case of
the 802.11 protocol, the properties of interest, including the
real time ones, are all expressible in this form. For exam-
ple, in the case of a probabilistic timed automaton A, the
PCTL formula P<0.5 {♦p} directly translates to maximum
probabilistic reachability on the induced Markov decision
process [[A]] from a well-defined start state. We mark the
target states as those where the proposition p is true. The
model checker returns true when this maximum probabil-
ity is smaller than 0.5. Under this restricted form of PCTL,
we indicate numerical equivalence using the following no-
tation.
Definition 6 Two probabilistic systems P1 and P2 are
equivalent under probabilistic reachability of their respec-
tive target states F1 and F2, denoted by
P1
PS
≡ F1,F2 P2 when MaxProbReachP1(F1) =
MaxProbReachP2(F2)
and MinProbReachP1(F1) = MinProbReachP2(F2).
Definition 7 PTA1
PTA
≡ φ1,φ2 PTA2 when
[[PTA1]]
PS
≡ F1,F2 [[PTA2]]. The criterion for mark-
ing target states is that F1 corresponds to the target
states in the reachability problem for the PCTL for-
mula φ1, while F2 corresponds to the target states for the
PCTL formula φ2.
4. Probabilistic Models of the 802.11 Protocol
In this section, we present scalable probabilistic models
of the 802.11 basic access MAC protocol assuming no hid-
den nodes1. The model for the multi-station 802.11 problem
consists of the station model and a shared channel, shown
in Figures 4 and 9 respectively. We assume familiarity with
conventions used in graphical representation of timed au-
tomata. In particular, the states marked with a ’u’ are ur-
gent states while that marked by concentric circles is the
start state. The station models are are replicated to represent
multiple sender-destination pairs. Some critical state vari-
ables are: bc that holds the current backoff counter value,
tx len that holds the chosen transmission length and back-
off that represents the current remaining time in backoff.
The functionRANDOM (bc) is a modeling abstraction that
assigns a random number in the current contention window.
Similarly, NON DET (TX MIN ,TX MAX ) assigns a
non-deterministic packet length between TX MIN and
TX MAX , which are the minimum and maximum al-
lowable packet transmission times respectively. The val-
ues used for verification are from the Frequency Hopping
Spread Spectrum (FHSS) physical layer [9]. The transmis-
sion rate for the data payload is 2 Mbps.
1 In the absence of hidden nodes [3], the channel is a shared medium
visible to all the stations.
The station automaton shown in Figure 4, begins
with a data packet whose transmission time it se-
lects non-deterministically in the range from 258µs to
15750µs. On sensing the channel free for a Distributed In-
terFrame Space (DIFS = 128µs), it enters the Vulnerable
state, where it switches its transceiver to transmit mode and
begins transmitting the signal. TheVulnerable state also ac-
counts for propagation delay. It moves to the Transmit
state after a time VULN = 48µs with a synchroniza-
tion on send . After completing transmission, the station
moves to Test channel via one of the two synchroniza-
tions, finish correct on a successful transmission and
finish garbled on an unsuccessful transmission. The chan-
nel keeps track of the status of transmissions, going into
a garbled state whenever more than one transmission oc-
curs simultaneously. The station incorporates the behav-
ior of the destination and diverges depending on whether
the transmission was successful, or not. If the transmis-
sion was successful, the portion of the station corre-
sponding to the destination waits for a Short InterFrame
Space (SIFS = 28µs) amount of time before trans-
mitting an ack, which takes ACK = 183µs amount of
time.
On an unsuccessful transmission, the station waits for
the acknowledgment timeout of ACK TO = 300µs. It
then enters a backoff phase, where it probabilistically se-
lects a random backoff period backoff= RANDOM (bc).
RANDOM (bc) is a function that selects with uniform
probability, a value from the contention window given by
the range [0, (C+1).2bc−1], whereC is the minimum con-
tention window (15µs for the FHSS physical layer). The
backoff counter (bc) is incremented each time the station
enters backoff. The backoff counter is frozen when a sta-
tion detects a transmission on the medium while in back-
off.
The station and channel models are different from those
in [15]. The station now fixes a packet transmission length
non-deterministically and remembers it rather than allow it
to vary on every retransmission. The channel of [15] as-
sumes a fixed topology of two stations, while the channel
depicted in Figure 9 is generalized for an arbitrary number
of stations. It follows a different design from that in [15],
which if generalized would have states exponential in the
number of stations. Ours is only linear. Since the models are
generalized to an arbitrary number of stations, the synchro-
nization labels have subscripts indicating the station num-
ber. However, in the rest of the paper we drop subscripts
whenever the station number is clear from the context.
We point out here that we start with an abstracted sta-
tion model, which incorporates the deterministic destina-
tion. That this is a valid abstraction has already been shown
for the two station case in [15]. The extension to the multi
station case does not represent any significant new result
and hence has been omitted.
5. Compression of Deterministic Paths: A
Technique for State Space Reduction
In the 802.11 protocol, there are numerous cases
where the component automata representing the sys-
tem simply count time or where different resolutions of
non-determinism lead to same state but through differ-
ent paths. If we are verifying an untimed property then such
fine grained analysis increases state space without any con-
tribution to probabilistic reachability. We discovered on
studying these models that it is possible to derive al-
ternative optimized probabilistic timed automata that
avoid the cost of such unnecessary deterministic behav-
ior by compressing these deterministic paths into equiv-
alent but shorter paths. The problem is the lack of a
suitable formalism to support our optimizations. This sec-
tion provides a framework that can be used to justify
the equivalence of our optimized models to the origi-
nal ones.
For purposes of comparison, we assume that the state
space is a subset of an implicit global set of states. This al-
lows operations such as intersection and union between the
set of states of two different automata. In particular, for this
paper we consistently name states across the automata we
consider.
Our objective is to formalize “deterministic” behavior of
interest. The key relationship used in this formalization is a
specialization of dominators as defined in [6]. We refer to
this restricted version of dominators as “deterministic dom-
inators” in the rest of this paper.
Definition 8 For a distribution π over the finite elemen-
tary event set X , define the support of the distribution as
supp(π) = {x ∈ X | π(x) > 0}
Definition 9 Given a probabilistic system consisting of the
set of states S, define ≺D as the smallest relation in S × S
satisfying the following: ∀s ∈ S
s ≺D s and
∃t ∈ S [∀(a, π) ∈ Steps(s) : ∃x (supp(π) = {x}) ∧
(x ≺D t)]⇒ s ≺D t
If the relation s ≺D t holds then we say that t is the deter-
ministic dominator of s.
An example of a deterministic dominator is shown in the
probabilistic systems of Figure 1, where S ≺D T .
Definition 10 Given distributions P1 over S1 and P2 over
S2, define P1 dist≡ P2 when supp(P1) = supp(P2) = S and
∀s ∈ S we have P1(s) = P2(s).
Based on the notion of equivalence of distributions, we de-
fine the notion of equivalence of sets of distributions. Let
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Figure 1: Two related Probabilistic Systems
Steps1 be a set of labeled distributions over S1 and Steps2
be a set of labeled distributions over S2.
Definition 11 Steps1
dist
≡ Steps2 whenever
∀(a, µ1) ∈ Steps1 ∃(b, µ2) ∈ Steps2 such that µ1
dist
≡ µ2
and ∀(a, µ2) ∈ Steps2 ∃(b, µ1) ∈ Steps1 with µ2
dist
≡ µ1.
Define a path in a probabilistic system as follows:
Definition 12 A path in the probabilistic system
P = (S, s,Σ, Steps) is a sequence of state-action
pairs (s1, a1), (s2, a2)..(sn+1) such that ∀i ∈ {1..n} we
have ∃(ai, µ) ∈ Steps(si) such that µ(si+1) > 0.
5.1. Deterministic Path Compression in Proba-
bilistic Systems
Consider the two probabilistic systems of Figure 1, each
of which has the start state U . It should be clear that each
of MaxProbReach(X) and MinProbReach(X) takes the
same value in both the systems since we have only removed
(compressed) the deterministic segment B → C. We for-
malize this notion of deterministic path compression at the
level of probabilistic systems in theorem 1.
Consider two finite probabilistic systems
PS1(S1, s,Act , Steps1) and PS 2(S2, s,Act , Steps2)
with an identical set of actions. All transitions in Steps1
and Steps2 are simple transitions of the form (s, a, µ)
where s is the originating state, a ∈ Act and µ is a prob-
ability distribution over the state space. Note that the S1
and S2 are necessarily not disjoint because of the com-
mon start state s.
Definition 13 If, for some s ∈ S1 ∩ S2, Steps1(s)
dist
≡
Steps2(s) does not hold then s is a point of disagreement
between the two probabilistic systems.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence in Probabilistic Systems)
Given two probabilistic systems PS 1(S1, s,Act , Steps1)
and PS 2(S2, s,Act , Steps2) satisfying the following con-
ditions:
1. For any state s ∈ S1 ∩ S2, if s is a point of disagree-
ment then ∃t ∈ S1 ∩ S2 such that, t is not a point of
disagreement and in each of the systems, s ≺D t.
2. Let F1 ⊆ S1 and F2 ⊆ S2 be sets of target states we
are model checking for. We impose the condition S1 ∩
S2∩F1 = S1 ∩S2 ∩F2. For every s ∈ S1 ∩S2, which
is a point of disagreement we have the following: For
the postulated deterministic dominator t and for every
state u on any path in PS 1 between s and t, u ∈ F1 ⇒
(s ∈ F1)∨(t ∈ F1). Similarly, for every state u on any
path in PS 2 between s and t, u ∈ F2 ⇒ (s ∈ F2) ∨
(t ∈ F2).
Under these conditions, PS 1
PS
≡ F1,F2 PS 2.
The proof follows from first principles by setting up a bi-
jective mapping between paths in the two probabilistic sys-
tems. The complete proof is available in [1].
5.2. Equivalence of Probabilistic Timed Automata
Given two Probabilistic Timed Automata PTA1 and
PTA2 and their respective restricted PCTL requirements
φ1 and φ2, we need a set of conditions under which we
may claim PTA1
PTA
≡ φ1,φ2 PTA2. By Definition 7, this
is equivalent to showing that [[PTA1]]
PS
≡ F1,F2 [[PTA2]],
where F1 and F2 are the corresponding target states of φ1
and φ2 respectively. Our optimizations are based on deter-
ministic path compression as outlined in Section 5. Hence,
we impose requirements on PTA1 and PTA2 under which
we can apply theorem 1 to [[PTA1]] and [[PTA2]] to de-
duce [[PTA1]]
PS
≡ F1,F2 [[PTA2]]. The following lemmas
have the objective of establishing these requirements.
Consider two Probabilistic Timed Automata with
an identical set of clocks and events: PTA1 =
(L1, l1, χ,Σ, I1, P1) and PTA2 = (L2, l2, χ,Σ, I2, P2).
We assume that the automata have the same set of ur-
gent events, Σu.
Definition 14 A state s ∈ L1 ∩ L2 is a point of disagree-
ment between the two probabilistic timed automata if either
they differ on the invariant or they differ in the set of out-
going transitions. Taking a transition out of a state s as the
tuple (s, z, σ, P (2χ × L)), call two transitions different if
they disagree on either the guard z, or the event label on
the transition σ, or the distribution P (2χ × L).
The semantic probabilistic systems are [[PTA1]] and
[[PTA2]] respectively. Let States([[PTA1]]) and
States([[PTA2]]) denote states of the semantic proba-
bilistic systems for PTA1 and PTA2 respectively. The
states in the semantic PS are tuples (s, v) where s is a state
of the PTA and v is a clock valuation.
Lemma 1 A state (s, v) ∈ States([[PTA1]]) ∩
States([[PTA2]]) is a point of disagreement (with re-
gard to condition 1 of theorem 1) between the two PS im-
plies that s is a point of disagreement between PTA1 and
PTA2.
The condition that labels should also be identical might
seem too restrictive considering that we are only interested
in probabilistic reachability. However, the next set of lem-
mas will show that when composing PTAs labels are impor-
tant.
Most real world systems and the 802.11 protocol in par-
ticular are modeled as a composition of PTAs. In a com-
posed system, the above lemma will only tell us whether a
particular common state in the PTA can generate a point of
disagreement in the semantic PS. This common state rep-
resents the composed state of all the PTAs composing the
model. The next few lemmas extend lemma 1 to the sce-
nario of composed probabilistic timed automata.
Definition 15 Consider two PTAs formed of compositions,
as follows.
PTA1 = PTA
1
1 ‖ PTA
1
2 ‖ PTA
1
3 ‖ .. ‖ PTA
1
n and
PTA2 = PTA
2
1 ‖ PTA
2
2 ‖ PTA
2
3 ‖ .. ‖ PTA
2
n.
Define the difference set as the set D ⊆ {1, 2, .., n} such
that ∀i ∈ D : PTA1i 6= PTA2i and ∀i /∈ D : PTA1i =
PTA2i . By equality we mean exactly the same automaton in
both the compositions (component wise equality of the tu-
ples defining them).
Definition 16 We define the specific difference set for the
index i ∈ D as Di ⊆ states(PTA1i )∩states(PTA2i ) where
Di is the set of states that disagree across the automata as
outlined in definition 14. For every i /∈ D set Di = ∅.
Lemma 2 Consider the composed PTA models of Defini-
tion 15. Let Scommon be the set of common states be-
tween PTA1 and PTA2. A composed state in Scommon , say
(l1, l2, .., ln) is a point of disagreement between PTA1 and
PTA2 implies that at least one automaton is in its specific
difference set.
In the composed PTAs of definition 15, Each state in the se-
mantic PS for a PTA is a combination of states and clock
valuations of the individual PTA in the composition. The
next lemma combines lemma 1 and lemma 2.
Lemma 3 (PTA level requirements) A state in
States([[PTA1]]) ∩ States([[PTA2]]) = (s1, s2.., sn, v)
is a point of disagreement implies that for at least one
i ∈ {1..n}, the common state si of both PTA1i and PTA2i
is an element of their specific disagreement set.
The purpose of lemma 3 is to identify precisely those states
in the component PTA that may cause a disagreement in the
PS for the composed system.
5.3. Proof Technique
We will use the framework in this section to prove the
correctness of our reduced models. Although our objective
is the 802.11 protocol, the concept of deterministic path
compression has been developed in a generalized manner
anticipating its application to other protocols.
To prove that a reduced PTA model (PTA2) correspond-
ing to the original PTA model (PTA1) is correct, we need
to prove that PTA1
PTA
≡ φ1,φ2 PTA2. Here φ1 and φ2 are
the corresponding PCTL formulas in the two models. For
our purposes φ1 = φ2 since we are interested in proving
that we will arrive at the same result for the same particu-
lar PCTL formula. We proceed with the proof in the follow-
ing manner.
1. Identify the difference set (Definition 15). Compute the
specific difference set of each component automaton in the
difference set using Definition 16. This is easily done by a
visual inspection of the automata.
2. Identify composed states where one or more automata
are in their specific difference set. At this point we use pro-
tocol specific proofs to limit such combinations to a man-
ageable size. From Lemma 2 we know the set of composed
states obtained in this step is a superset of the actual differ-
ence set across the composed PTA.
3. For each composed state, we argue about the possible
evolution of the untimed model obtained through Defini-
tion 3. We show that in each case
i) There is the same deterministic dominator in each of
[[PTA1]] and [[PTA2]]. This is the hardest part of the proof.
However, we use the fact that the deterministic domina-
tor state in the PS is expressible as the combination of a
composed state and clock valuation in the PTA. Hence the
proofs are in terms of the PTA rather than the PS. We gener-
ally show that each component automaton reaches the state
in the composition and progress can only be made when the
entire model is in the composed state.
ii) Final states in [[PTA1]] and [[PTA2]], corresponding to
the PCTL formulas φ1 and φ2 respectively, are distributed
as specified in condition 2 of Theorem 1.
From Lemma 3 we know that this is sufficient for Theo-
rem 1 to hold. Hence we conclude that at the level of PTAs
PTA1
PTA
≡ φ1,φ2 PTA2.
Deterministic Path Compression, at the level of Proba-
bilistic Systems bears similarity to weak bisimulation [19]
that can abstract away internal actions. However, a notable
difference in our approach from weak bisimulation is that
we are able to change invariants on states in the Probabilis-
tic Timed Automata. This corresponds to removing time
steps (Definition 3) in the corresponding semantic proba-
bilistic system. These time steps are not internal actions be-
cause composed probabilistic systems must synchronize on
time steps to maintain the semantics of PTA composition.
A possibility would be to apply weak bisimulation to the fi-
nal composed model but this would mean fixing the number
of stations in the composition. The reduced models would
no longer be valid for the general multi station problem.
6. Reducing the 802.11 Station Automaton
For the 802.11 problem, we optimize the station automa-
ton, in multiple steps, starting from the original abstract sta-
tion model of Figure 4. In each case, the set of final states
correspond to the PCTL formula φ = P<λ[♦(bc = k)]. For
every reduction from PTA1 to PTA2, we prove the correct-
ness of our optimizations by showing that PTA1
PTA
≡ φ,φ
PTA2. Due to space constraints, we omit the complete
proofs (they are available in [1]) and only motivate the key
ideas. Our proofs are driven by behavior exhibited by the
802.11 PTA models. For example, a key aspect of many of
our proofs is the fact that 802.11 backoff counters are frozen
when a busy channel is detected. This sets the 802.11 pro-
tocol apart from other contention based protocols such as
the 802.3 [8] and is useful because we can essentially ig-
nore stations in backoff when the channel is busy.
6.1. Removing the SIFS Wait
Our first optimization removes the SIFS wait fol-
lowing a successful transmission. The original model is
AbsLAN = AbsStn1 ‖ AbsStn2 ‖ .. ‖ AbsStnn ‖ Chan
and the reduced model is IntLAN = IntStn1 ‖
IntStn2 ‖ .. ‖ IntStnn ‖ Chan . The intermediate sta-
tion model IntStn with the SIFS wait removed in shown
in Figure 5. The difference set (see Definition 15) in-
cludes all the stations and does not include the chan-
nel, which is unchanged. The specific difference set is only
the Test Channel urgent state immediately after assert-
ing finish correct . The key idea of the proof is as fol-
lows: All the other stations will detect the busy channel
and move into the Wait until free or Wait until free II
state. The successfully completing station will move into
the Done state while the rest of the stations will move ei-
ther into Wait for DIFS or Wait for DIFS II states,
which gives us a deterministic dominator in both the au-
tomata (AbsLAN and IntLAN ). In the proof, we exploit
the fact that in the 802.11 protocol, the backoff coun-
ters are frozen when a transmission is detected on the
channel. This is modeled by the station in Backoff mov-
ing into the Wait until free II state. The key idea of the
proof, in an example for three stations, is shown in Fig-
ure 3.
6.2. Removing the DIFS Wait
In the final reduced station model RedStn of
Figure 7, the DIFS wait has been removed. The
model is given by the composition RedLAN =
RedStn1||RedStn2..||RedStnn||Chan . Proving the deter-
ministic dominator relationship is a little more complicated
here because we need to consider both collision and suc-
cessful transmission cases. In each case however, all sta-
tions detect the busy channel and move to Wait until free
or Wait until free II . The specific difference set
consists of Wait until free, Wait until free II and
Wait for ACK TO . In the semantic probabilistic sys-
tem corresponding to the composed model we can always
prove that for any point of disagreement and for any ad-
versary, there is always a deterministic dominator, which
is the state of the system after the DIFS wait is over.
The key idea for a three station example is shown in Fig-
ure 2.
In RedStn we continue to keep the Wait for DIFS
state. The reason for this is as follows. It is possible for a
station to leave Wait for ACK TO and wait for DIFS
amount of time while all other stations which have not trans-
mitted are sitting in Backoff. Since the amount of time spent
in backoff is unpredictable, there is no deterministic domi-
nator. Consequently, we cannot simply remove the DIFS
wait after Wait for ACK TO. However, we may always
remove the transition into this state due to the DIFS wait
on detecting a busy channel after transmission. Again, a key
component of the proof is the fact that 802.11 backoff coun-
ters are frozen on detecting a busy channel. This allows us
to essentially ignore the stations in backoff during transmis-
sion.
6.3. Restricting the allowed transmission length
The major contributor of state space in the protocol is
the large range of allowed transmission lengths. The range
is from 315µs to 15717µs and this proves to be a signifi-
cant impediment.
We make a minor change in our PTA models, with the
objective of making the proofs of equivalence more direct.
Rather than having a non-deterministic edge that selects
packet lengths, which are subsequently held constant, we
parameterize the models by a packet length and remove
the non-deterministic choice. Hence, we now have a se-
ries of PTA models depending on the choice of parame-
terizations. The allowable assignment of packet (transmis-
sion) lengths is from Par full , the set of all possible pa-
rameterizations. Each of tx len1, .., tx lenn is assigned a
value from the interval [TX MIN ,TX MAX ]. Formally,
Par full = [TX MIN ,TX MAX ]n.
Consider the reduced set of parameterizations
Par reduced ⊂ Par full where tx len1 = TX MIN
and tx len i+1 − tx len i ≤ VULN , 1 ≤ i < n. Here
we restrict the maximum allowable increase in trans-
mission length of one station over its immediate pre-
decessor. This eliminates many parameterizations that
would have assigned transmission lengths close to maxi-
mum resulting in a large state space. We have shown using
the framework of Section 5 that it is sufficient to con-
sider only this limited range of transmission lengths.
The key objective is to show that for every model PTA1
whose parameters are selected from Par full , there ex-
ists a model PTA2 whose parameters are contained in
Par reduced such that PTA1
PTA
≡ φ,φ PTA2. Here the spe-
cific difference set is only the Transmit state whose
invariant is different in the two models (due to differ-
ing transmission lengths). Again, we use the fact that
802.11 backoff counters are frozen during transmis-
sion. This means that changing the transmission length has
no effect on stations that were in backoff when the chan-
nel became busy. The hardest part is to select a proper
model from Par reduced such that any m stations in a gen-
eralized n-station scenario, that collide by transmitting
simultaneously, complete transmission in the same or-
der in both the models. This is necessary because an
inspection of the station automaton shows that during a col-
lision, any station that finishes while some other station is
still occupying the channel, would detect the busy chan-
nel and behave differently from the station that finished
last. Hence ensuring that stations finish in the same or-
der leads to the same deterministic dominator in both the
models.
7. Soft Deadline Verification
The probability of meeting soft deadlines, which is the
minimum probability of a station delivering a packet within
a certain deadline, is a real time property that can be for-
mulated as a probabilistic reachability problem. For exam-
ple, in an 802.11 topology of three senders and three re-
ceivers, we are interested in the probability that every sta-
tion successfully transmits its packet within a given dead-
line. The reductions presented in this paper, which depend
on deterministic path compression, do not preserve total
time elapsed since certain states in the probabilistic timed
automata where the composite model can count have been
removed. As a result, paths are replaced with shorter (time
wise) versions.
However, one key aspect of our reductions is that they
affect deterministic and well-defined segments of the au-
tomata. The intuition is that it should be possible to “com-
pensate” for the reductions by using additional available
information. For example, removing the acknowledgment
protocol has the effect of subtracting a SIFS+ACK period
for every successful transmission made. On the other hand
removing DIFS wait results in subtracting DIFS from the
elapsed time for any transmission made.
We begin with the traditional “decoration” of a PTA
in order to verify real time properties, as exemplified in
[16]. Assume the existence of a composed state Done,
which is the composition of the state Done across the com-
ponents the model. Decorating the PTA involves adding
a global clock (say y) to the system that counts to-
tal time elapsed and a state Deadline exceeded . Edges
are added from each state other than Done, with guard
y ≥ deadline to Deadline exceeded . Every invariant ex-
cept at Done and Deadline exceeded is taken in con-
junction with y ≤ deadline . The objective is to model
check for the PCTL formula P>λ[♦Done], which ex-
presses the soft deadline property.
We depart from the traditional model by decorating
the PTA as follows: We define a non-decreasing linear
function φ(y,X) on the global clock and numerical sys-
tem variables (which does not include the clock valua-
tion). The global clock y and state Deadline exceeded are
added. Edges are added to Deadline exceeded with guard
φ(y,X) ≥ deadline . Each invariant is taken in conjunction
with φ(y,X) ≤ deadline . Since the dependence on X may
be represented as different functions depending on the cur-
rent state, we do not depart from the traditional definition
of a PTA. The idea is that while y represents absolute sys-
tem time, φ(y,X) represents a corrected version that takes
into account deterministic path compression.
In order to compute real time properties, we anno-
tate the channel with the extra variables transmissions
and successes, where each is initialized to zero in
the start state. The former is incremented on every
synchronization on finish correct or finish garbled
while the latter is incremented only on a syn-
chronization on finish correct . Their semantics,
hence, follow their nomenclature. In the RedLAN
model, without parameter restrictions, set φ(y,X) =
y+ successes ∗ (SIFS +ACK ) + transmissions ∗DIFS .
This function compensates for ack protocol removal by
adding SIFS + ACK for each successful transmission
and for DIFS removal by adding DIFS for every trans-
mission. For the AbsLAN model, we set φ(y,X) = y,
reflecting the standard construction. Due to space con-
straints we omit the proof of correctness of our construction
here. We essentially need to repeat the proofs referred to in
Section 6, taking into account the fact that a clock value as-
signed to y in the original model will be mapped to φ(y,X)
in the changed model and we are now model check-
ing for P>λ[♦Done].
We intend to extend our technique for retaining soft
deadline properties to cover parameter restrictions in future
Model States Transitions Choices
Original 5958233 16563234 11437956
Optimized 393958 958378 598412
Table 1: State space size for two stations - Our optimized
model vs. Kwiatkowska et al. [15] (original)
Stations 3 4
States 1084111823 1377418222475
Transitions 3190610466 5162674182210
Choices 1908688031 2958322202754
Table 2: State Space size for three and four stations - Opti-
mized models
work.
8. Verification Results
Our verification platform is a 1.2 GHz Pentium III
server with 1.5 GB of ECC memory and running Linux
2.4. Our experiments used the Multi-Terminal Binary De-
cision Diagram (MTBDD) engine of PRISM and all prop-
erties were checked with an accuracy of 10−6.
The largest constant in the model, even after the opti-
mizations, is 354. This is still prohibitively large. Hence,
before translating into actual PRISM models, we perform
a time scaling operation [15, 4]. For time scaling, we used
the backoff contention slot length of 50µs and divided all
guards and invariants by the chosen unit, rounding upper
bounds on the values of clocks up and lower bounds on
the values of clocks down. This is the only transformation
where we loosen the maximal and minimal probabilities to
bounds rather than exact values. We also removed the states
Backoff Time Time Maximum
Counter original optimized probability
(secs) (secs)
1 0.69 0.09 1.0
2 8.95 1.15 0.18359375
3 37.37 6.29 0.01703262
4 113.25 29.12 7.9424586e-4
5 327.04 120.5 1.8566660e-5
6 970.38 508.26 2.1729427e-7
Table 3: Probability of the backoff counter reaching a
specified value in the two station case - our model vs.
Kwiatkowska et al. [15] (original)
Backoff Iterations Time Maximum
Counter (sec) Probability
1 285 1428 1.0
2 107 124 0.59643554
3 259 1250 0.10435103
4 506 14183 0.008170952
5 525 37659 2.83169319e-4
6 947 246874 2.85355921e-5
Table 4: Probability of the backoff counter reaching a spec-
ified value in the three station case
Protocol Iterations Time Minimum
(sec) Probability
G.729(1) 85 613 0
G.729(2) 256 52388 0.011743453
Table 5: Minimum probability of meeting the soft deadline
for the real time case study
corresponding to acknowledgments from the channel, since
we no longer model them.
8.1. State Space Growth
The growth in state space for the multi station problem
is shown in Tables 1 and 2. We report the number of states
and transitions in the model. We also report the number of
choices, which is total number of nondeterministic choices
summed across all the states of the model. In Table 1 we
compare our optimized generalized model for the base case
of two station with the models of [15]. We show a signif-
icant improvement in model size. However, when we con-
sider models of three and four stations in Table 2, the unop-
timized models obtained by extending those of [15] cannot
even be built by the model checker within the resources pro-
vided. Hence, we only report the state space for our own op-
timized models.
8.2. Backoff Counter
We solve the probabilistic model checking problem of
computing the upper bound on the probability of the back-
off counter on any station reaching a specified value.
As a starting point, we show that our generalized models
are capable of reproducing the results of the specialized two
station models of [15]. In Table 1 we show state space cost
and in Table 3 we show verification costs. Our results are
the same as in [15] but the verification costs are lower.
The same results in the case of a three station network is
shown in Table 4. The probabilities are higher than the two
station case. This is to be expected since three stations rep-
resents more contention for the channel than the two station
case. It has been mentioned that the 3 station problem us-
ing the original unoptimized station models are beyond the
reach of PRISM on our platform.
8.3. Voice over 802.11: A Real Time Case Study
An example of soft deadlines for probabilistic verifica-
tion is given by the following scenario: An area serviced by
a single 100 Mbps 802.3 Local Area Network is occupied
by three overlapping but independent wireless networks,
each consisting of an access point and n mobile devices.
All of these are equipped with 802.11 capabilities and the
access point is distributing voice data to each of the other n
stations in its network. We consider the specific case where
n = 7 and we use one of two variants of the G.729 [10]
voice encoding schemes. In the case of the G.729(1) vari-
ant the frame size is 64 bytes and bandwidth requirement is
33.6 Kbps, resulting in a soft deadline of 2196µs (rounding
down to get a stricter integral deadline). On the other hand,
in G.729(2) with a frame rate of 74 bytes and bandwidth re-
quirement of 19.2 Kbps, we have a soft deadline 4404µs.
For soft deadline verification, we start with a model param-
terized by the frame size. Subsequently, we use the the con-
struction of Section 7 on RedLAN for verification.
The results for the real time voice delivery problem that
translates into soft deadlines for a three station topology,
are reported in Table 5. They indicate that in the worst case
G.729(1) cannot meet the soft deadline requirements while
G.729(2) has only a 1% probability of doing so.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced deterministic path
compression, a new technique to remove protocol redun-
dancies. We have been successful in tackling the state space
problem for the 802.11 wireless LAN protocol. We have
also shown that it is possible to compute the minimum prob-
ability of meeting soft deadlines in spite of the optimiza-
tions. This is surprising because our optimizations, at first
sight, do not seem amenable to soft deadline verification.
We are yet to reach a solution that can make verifying
models with four or more stations feasible. One option is to
use the optimized models as input to a tool like RAPTURE,
which can identify dominators at the Probabilistic System
level, in a manner similar to our approach at the Probabilis-
tic Timed Automata level. Our work is still essential be-
cause it brings the model within reach of a tool like RAP-
TURE. It remains to be seen whether significant improve-
ments at the Probabilistic System level are possible. There
are also a number of extensions to the basic access proto-
col that we have considered. Modeling these would justify
application of probabilistic verification, which is extremely
expensive compared to simulation, to real world problems.
Acknowledgments: We thank Deepak D’ Souza for his con-
structive feedback and Marta Kwiatkowska with her col-
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Figure 2: Removing the difs wait - An example with 3 sta-
tions
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Figure 3: Removing the ack protocol - An example with 3
stations
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Figure 4: PTA model for an Abstract Station - represents
both the sender and destination
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Figure 5: PTA model for an Intermediate Abstracted and
Reduced Station - The ACK protocol has been removed
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